Electronically Filed

12/8/2020 11:57 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

FORD ELSAESSER in his capacity as
Personal Representative 0f the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Docket No.48 1 32-2020
Ada County Case N0. CV01-19-20686

Plaintiff—Respondent,
V.

LAW OFFICES OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho

company;
PC, an Idaho

limited liability

VERNON K. SMITH LAW,

Professional service corporation,

Defendants—Appellants.

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
Appeal

ﬁom the Fourth Judicial District

In and for the County ofAda
Honorable Michael Reardon, District Judge, Presiding

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900

W. Main

JACK W. RELF
ATTORNEY AT LAW
601

Street

W. Bannock

St

Tel. (208) 345-1 125

Givens Pursley, LLP.
Boise, ID 83701
Tel. (208) 388-1200

Fax:(208) 345—1 129

Fax. (208) 388-1300

Vkslaw@live.com

iackrelf@givenspurslev.com

A TTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

A TTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

Boise, Idaho 83702

ISB No. 1365

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

1

Table 0f Contents

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

...........................................................................................................

A. Reply T0 Respondent’s Nature
B. Reply
C.

4

Of The Case ................................................................................ 4

T0 Respondent’s “Course 0f Proceedings”: .....................................................................

16

Relief Appellant Requests Regarding The Rule 70(b) Instrument ............................................. 22

D. What Has Been The Unintended Consequence

Of The Rule 7O

E.

What Was The Intended Consequence Of The Rule

F.

Applicable Statutory Authority

G. Established Case

(b) Instrument

.......................

23

70(b) Instrument? .................................... 25

And Case Law On Property Ownership .................................. 27

Law Limitations On Personal Representative Ownership ............................. 28

H. What Has Transpired

By The Unintended Consequences Of Hillen’s Actions? ....................... 29

On Hillen’s Probate Authority .................................................................

I.

Statutory Limitations

J.

A Probate Court Had No Authority, By Use Of A Rule 70(b) Instrument,
T0 Defeat An Heir’s Ownership

A Matter OfLaW Under LC.

Interest In

§15-3-101

K. The Rule 70(b) Instrument, Construed

Decedent’s Property, Obtained

As

.....................................................................................

By Hillen To

Transfer

31

32

“OWNERSHIP”

Of Decedent’s Property T0 Him, Was Never Placed At Issue Or Decided Upon The
Appeal
L.

Of The Holographic Will And Power Of Attorney ....................................................... 37

There Can Be

CONCLUSION

No Enforcement Of A Void Instrument .............................................................. 44

.................................................................................................................................

47

w
***

I.C.

§15-3-101 .............................................................................................................................. 35, 43

I.C.

§15-3-701 .................................................................................................................................... 34

LC. §15-1-101 .................................................................................................................................... 17
I.C.

§15-3-101 ........................................................................................................................ 17, 30, 37

I.C.

§15-3-607 .................................................................................................................................... 33

I.C.

§15-3-703 .................................................................................................................................... 36

I.C.

§15-3-709 .................................................................................................................................... 18

I.C.

§15-3-711 .................................................................................................................. 17, 29, 35, 47

I.C.
I.C.

§15-3-712 .............................................................................................................................. 30, 33
§15-3-901 .................................................................................................................................... 34

I.C.

§15-3-906 .............................................................................................................................. 29, 35

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

2

Hillen

v.

Fisher 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871) ............................................................. 48
Gibson, Fourth Dist, Ada County Case N0. CV 01-19-10368 ......................................... 31

Hillen

v.

Law

Hillen

v.

Bradley

In

v.

V.

Oﬂices 0f Vernon K. Smith, er. al., Ada County Case N0. CV01-19-20686 ............. 31
K. Smith III, Ada County Case No. CV 01-19-10367 ................................................... 31

Re MacDonnell ’s Estate, 56 NeV

People

346, 53 P.2d 625, (1936)

American Contractors Indemnity

v.

16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004)

........................................................

46

C0., 33 Cal.4th 653,

.........................................................................................

38

LIES
IRCP

70(b) ......................................................................................................................................... 18

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Stump

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98

v.

S. Ct.

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) ..................................... 48

IDAHO SUPREME COURT
Ada County Highway Dist.

v.

Total Success Investments,

LLC, 145 Idaho

360,

179 P.3d 323 (2008) .................................................................................................................... 12, 51
v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) .............................................................. 45

Bashore

BHA Investments, Inc.
Burns

v.

v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004) ................. 48
Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003) ..................................................... 49

46
City ofPocatello v Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 306, 396 P.3d 1184, 1188 (2017) ........................... 46
Cuevas v. Barraza, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012) .................................................................................. 49
Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015) ........................................................... 27, 30
Fairchild v. Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722 (1984) ...................................................... 27, 3O
Caldwell

v.

Thiessen, 50 Idaho 515, 92 P.2d 1047 (1939)

Hartman

v.

United Heritage Prop.

& Cas.

...............................................................

Co.,141 Idaho 193, 197,

108 P.3d 340, 344 (2005) .................................................................................................................. 50
Hoﬂer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016) ................................................................ 52

Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans,
123 Idaho 573, 586, 850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993) ................................................................................. 45
In re Anderton ’s Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946) ........................................... 46
In re Estate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6, (2018) ................................................................. 28

Jim

& Maryann Plane Family Trust

v.

Skinner,

157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015) ................................................................................. 50
Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919) ....................................................... passim

Malone

Van Etten, 67 Idaho 294, 178 P.2d 382 (1947) ................................................................
McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928 (2008) ...........................................
North Side Canal C0. v. Idaho Farms C0,, 6O Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939) ........
Path t0 Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016) .................................
Petty v Petty, 70 Idaho 473, 223 P.2d 158 (1950) .............................................................................
Pro Indiviso, Inc. v Mid—Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1998)....
Schieche v. Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964) ........................................................
SeaboardAir Line Ry. C0. v. Fowler, 275 F. 239, 240 (W.D.N.C., 1921) ......................................
Sierra Life Ins. C0. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978) ..................... 48,
Smith v. Angel], 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992) ......................................................
Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123, 261 P. 244, 245 (1927) ....................................................
v.

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P. 3

46
46
45
46
12
12

38
48
49
44

45

State

v.

Vaught

Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3 (201
v.

1)

........................................

39

62 Idaho 352, 120 P.2d 259 (1941) ..................................................................... 46

Struble,

IDAHO COURT OF APPEALS
McClure Engineering, Ina,

Channel 5 KIDA,
143 Idaho 950, 953, 155 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Ct. App. 2006) ..............................................................
State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008) ..................................................
State v. Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577, 580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2 (Ct. App. 2012) ......................
State v. Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct. App. 2014) ...........................................
v.

49
38
39
39

FEDERAL DISTRICT OF IDAHO
AWInterm Inc.
Hash

v.

U.S.,

Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1091-92 (D. Idaho 2010) ..... 45
454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D. Idaho 2006) ............................................................... 45
v.

Battelle

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Reply

T0 Respondent’s Nature Of The Case
t0 as “Hillen” for continuity Within the brieﬁng

Respondent (referred
original Plaintiff, but

now replaced by Ford Elsaesser,

argues the lower Court determined found the

Personal Representative (“PR”) has met the required elements for
established, the lower Court

as a matter 0f law,

must ﬁnd

Which the

that the

statutory authority

and record), was the

PR was

ej ectment.

the “titled

For

that t0

have been

owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

and case law contradicts such a factual ﬁnding and

prohibits such a legal conclusion, as neither the statute nor case history place “title” of a

Decedent’s property With a ﬁduciary; as the Statute only authorizes a ﬁduciary (PR) to pursue
possession to resolve creditor claims/ interested persons, statutorily conferred upon a

PR under the

Idaho Uniform Probate Code, as identiﬁed in Appellant’s Opening Brief.

By

Statute,

and conﬁrmed by case law,

title

(ownership)

t0

Decedent’s

interests

immediately vest With the devisees 0r heirs upon death, not a ﬁduciary. These Appellant are
entities that

occupy the ofﬁce

“Vernon”), identiﬁed as the

argument of Hillen

facility

through the possession 0f Vernon K. Smith

2/3rds heir

of Decedent’s property

that Decedent’s assets include the

interests,

and

it

Jr.

(hereafter

has been the

1900 Main St Complex, Where the Ofﬁce

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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building possessed

by Vernon

is

located,

and Vernon has been

in possession

since 1970, and continues with his right to possession at present ,yet never

and indispensably party in

this

Complex, not any

right of possession.

titled interest

was placed With possession 0f the

Vernon

is

a vested 2/3““ titled owner 0f

property,

commencing

remodeling, renovation, restoration, preservation,
Victoria’s expressed

now

With

Vernon remains

appeal,

Ann Smith

Converse,

his entitlement to

this particular

t0

in 1970,

and

retain possession thereafter,

and declared intentions

Who was

2/3rds heir,

fully

interior

and maintenance 0f the

this Intestate disposition created

be a

Vernon

(Victoria) in1970 (the Decadent)

under the arrangements upon Which he has engaged periods 0f extensive

son, Vernon, but

as a necessary

held by Hillen under the applicable statute and case law.

Through the arrangements made with Victoria H. Smith

consistent With

named

controversy over possession, referring only to the entities that

occupy the premises through Vernon’s
the entire

0f the Ofﬁce building

entire

that all property shall

by

and exterior

g0

the Magistrate and

having received the assignment from his

Complex,
t0 her

one

afﬁrmed 0n

sister,

Victoria

aware of their Mother’s long held intentions. Vernon expects

an in-kind distribution 0f Decedent’s

assets,

and Vernon will

retain full

title

to

property and the complex structures he remodeled and/or constructed, consistent

With the extensive historic improvements and construction—repairs t0 the building structures, having

been delayed With

and

this

his previously staged exterior restoration to the stucco exterior

probate controversy.

Hillen, however, has

been pre-disposed

t0 needlessly liquidate assets,

an approaching will soon be $2 million in wasted fees and
being

among

liability

due to ﬁnancing

the wastefulness)

had been resolved.

knowing

The

there are

no

having churned out

costs, (these District

creditors in the Estate

Court proceedings

and represented the tax

senseless effect 0f needless possession to effectuate undesired

liquidations serves only to create capital gains taxation

on those funds exceeding the stepped-up

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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basis, denied the right t0 continue with these

by compelling
be

the 2/3““ heir to endure a needless tax assessment

sold, but retained

property, as the heirs

Court,

his

own the property interests

,

subj ect only t0

Court must prove “ownership”,
factor

and the reason for

conﬁrms

that the “vested

this

and

A Party

was

t0

litigation

be addressed

to a

Court under the

seeking “ejectment” of a property holding in District

appeal—as the

statutory authority

proceeding—a

controlling

and well-established case law

owners” of Decedent’s property are the heirs and devisees, as

embodied within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), declaring them

owners—not ownership

t0

be the

and vested

titled

PR, who, as a matter of law, cannot own any part of a Decedent’s

property assets, historically announced in 1919, and effective to this day, expressed in

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184
Unless

and chosen

this

P. 222,

1

John

223 (1919)1

to

to distinguish this well-established fundamental principle

by a Magistrate
Lemp born
He came

Boise, Idaho,

signiﬁcant landowner.

view the matter

70(b)

an ownership interest in a ﬁduciary, the Instrument Hillen

United States in 1852 and to Idaho in 1863.

He was

differently

IRCP

was from Neiderweisel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Germany, and died July
to the

v

0f law in Lemp, supra, no

a Decedent’s property interests, pre-empting any

to create such

Lemp

.

make-up of the Idaho Supreme Court has come

PR can claim t0 “own any part of’
entry

is

should never have

in probate

the ﬁrst 0f three elements in such a

titled

t0

for decades.

do not possess the element 0f “ownership”, Which

initiated in District Court, as the matter

“necessity” element of the Statute.

Mother

was never

an established “necessity” With the

fundamental t0 Ej ectment Actions, compromised ﬁthher that such

been

the property

in this appeal is restoring the issue 0f “ownership” in the

Hillen-Elsaesser

as

When

and preserved as the 2/3rds heir has done With

The fundamental challenge

probate

unique properties, with foolish and unwanted results

He

18,

1912 in

operated a brewery and became a

generous and personally paid the burial costs for

at least

20 area pioneers. He

enjoyed reading history and had a vast knowledge of historical facts. He became the President 0f First National
Bank 0f Idaho, was a member 0f the constitutional convention and served as a Boise Council Member and Boise

Mayor, then having died

at the

leaving an Estate at an estimated value 0f $800,000, the equivalent of

almost (17) million dollars in current time values. Our probate code derived guidance from his judicial controversy.

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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has chosen t0 rely upon.
the heirs,

by

statute,

By

law, a Decedent’s ownership, as in this matter, went exclusively t0

When

not to any ﬁduciary 0r Estate.

a Decedent’s interest

is

established,

ownership transfers to the heirs or devisees immediately, pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code

(UPC) and

consistently

conﬁrmed by case

law, as addressed in the Opening Brief.

Respondent’s narrative within the “Nature of the Case”, indicates Hillen’s counsel caused

of the Appellant

the

ej ectment

the

“Law Ofﬁce”.

A more

entities

from a “portion of Estate-owned property”, referring

“correct statement”

would be

the Appellant entities

property possessed by Vernon, an heir Whose interest in that property

0f Decadent, as only heirs or devisees become the

“titled

is

heirs exclusively

Vernon

commitment to

since 1970, ﬁllﬁlling his

The pleadings 0f Record

assert Hillen

it

as

were ejected from

exclusively

owned by heirs

owners” of Decedent’s property. The

lower Court entered Judgment on the Pleadings (Motion for JOTP), ejecting the Appellant

from the very property the two

to

entities

own, which has been exclusively possessed by

his Mother.

owned

the property, wherein he claimed “exclusive

ownership” by Virtue of the controversial IRCP 70(b) Instrument entry by the Magistrate on June

2,

2017, an Instrument that remains Violative 0f both the Statute and the established case law.
Hillen describes the “Nature of the Case” in the following manner:

The Law Firm—but mostly Vernon—claims the Estate, acting through the PR, lacks
an unwanted party from Estate—owned property. Cutting

the authority t0 eject

through the

Law

Firm’s/Vernon’s irrelevant and incorrect facts and points, the

disposition of this appeal

amounts

to a single issue: does the

as a personal representative, t0 eject

(Emphasis added). (Resp. Brief,
This

is

worded almost

PR have the

authority,

an unwanted party from Estate property.

P. 2)

identically t0 the

argument addressed by Hillen in the Gibson

appeal, and the VKSIII appeal, as cited in Hillen v Gibson,

Ada County Case N0. CV01-19-10368, and Hillen

v.

Supreme Court Docket N0. 47687-2020,

Vernon K. Smith

III,

Supreme Court Docket

N0. 47884-2020, Ada County Case N0. CV01-19-10367. Hillen, Within the Gibson appeal, never

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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PR

expressed his authority rested 0n the objective 0f a

to “eject

an unwanted party from estate

property”. Hillen’s allegation was a claim of his “exclusive ownership” t0 Decedent’s property, an
entitlement he claims bestowed

on June

2,

upon him by

the

IRCP

70(b) Instrument entered

by

the Magistrate

2017, relying upon that Instrument t0 advance his claim for ejectment, knowing

“ownership”, must be established to provide standing t0

ej ect

anyone from possession of property.

Hillen understood he had to prove “ownership” to sustain a claim for

asserted that Appellant entities

Vernon’s possession was a

were an “unwanted party” by

critical

beneﬁt

either the

ej ectment,

but never

Decedent 0r the

heirs, as

and preservation, not

t0 the property’s protection

currently conveniently suited for any rental market.

This “idea” of a “personal representative having authority t0 eject an unwantedpartyfrom
Estate property”

is

now

Hillen’s “evolving” approach in this appeal, realizing neither the Statute

nor the case law supports his

and contradiction

“titled

ownership” theory, and the 70(b) Instrument

is

an aberration

to the controlling law.

Hillen, then acting in his capacity as a

PR,

is

vested with certain rights relative to a need for

possession, but only t0 the extent expressed within the limitations and restrictions 0f the

Uniform

Probate Code (UPC), as articulated Within Appellant’s Opening Brief, and hereinafter.

For Hillen to get where he went, Hillen needed to embrace the erroneously worded overreaching

IRCP

70(b) Instrument, incorrectly placing “ownership” With Hillen,

belong to heirs as required by

statute

when

it

could only

and case law.

Hillen realizes his conundrum, having abandoned his theory “I

own

it”,

now

relying

upon

the postulation “the disposition 0f this appeal amounts t0 a single issue: does Hillen have the

authority, as

Brief, P. 2).

personal representative, t0 eject an unwanted party from Estate property”. (Resp.

The answer

t0 the issue raised in the pleadings is forthcoming

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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from the

UPC

and case

law:

No

Estate property

have authority

to take

is

owned by a PR,

any action

titled to

and vested

to take possession Without a

restricted within the

UPC, and by

Decedent’s property

interests.

in his pleadings, nor his

it is

t0 the

and a

showing 0f necessity

well-established authority, a ﬁduciary cannot

The “unwanted Party from

argument

in the heirs,

Estate property”

PR does

not

for the reasons

own any

was not

part of a

his allegation

lower court.

This present “issue” announced by Hillen-Elsaesser

is

not the concept articulated or

advocated in the pleadings and brieﬁng t0 the lower Court, and not an issue reserved for appeal 0r
t0

be found in

this

record 0n appeal. This Court will not

appeal, or this appeal,

ﬁnd within

the Gibson 0r the

any alleged “an unwanted party”, With a statutory right “to

unwanted party from Estate property”,

as that

was never

alleged,

VKS III
eject

an

and they each were beneﬁcial

occupants 0f the respective properties 0n Which they were authorized by the Decadent t0 possess in
years—2004, 2006, and 1970 respectively.

As each Appellant
appeal, if Hillen-Elsaesser

property,

fail,

coming

is

Ofﬁce building

are

VKS

Gibson and

no longer claiming

to

III appeal,

be the exclusive

and maintained in
“titled

is critical

and fundamental

the only person

to

to eliminate the Appellant entities

by anyone

to

from the

be “an unwanted party”. Neither the

Decedent, during any of the 43 years preceding Victoria’s death (1970-2013)
interest in the property,

must

an Ej ectment Action.

0n record wanting

property, never declared

,

nor anyone of

has ever regarded Vernon 0r any Appellant entity t0 be other than a

valuable asset and a Vital beneﬁt t0 the property under the restoration/renovation arrangements.

heir has ever

this

owner” 0f the

to realize only the heirs are statutorily declared such, this ejectment action

as “ownership”

Hillen

stated in the

gone 0n record

t0 say

Vernon 0r any Appellant

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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“an unwanted party”.

N0

Hillen, a Chapter 7 Trustee

by

demonstrating any necessity under the

no

creditors exist in the Estate as

prior years,

and any federal

UPC t0 take possession from heirs,

Vernon satisﬁed

estate tax

all

UPC

and

VKSIII appeal, asserting he

is

in contradiction

now advanced

cloaked With authority “t0

property”, though n0 such authority

is

is

W611 aware

in

0f well-established case law, but
titled

in this appeal

ej ect

Mother

satisﬁed.

“evolving” from this mis—guided assertion as being the “exclusive

exclusion of an heir], t0 his evolving theory as

and Hillen

debts and creditors 0f his Father or

was represented t0 have been

Hillen chooses to act outside the

now

profession, merely seeks to liquidate properties, without

owner”, [even to the

and

in the

Gibson and

an unwanted party from Estate

placed with a ﬁduciary under the

UPC, and such proposition

does not meet the requirements of an ejectment claim recognized in law. (See Ada County Highway
Dist.

Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369,179 P.3d 323,332 (2008));

v.

Indiviso, Inc. v

Petty,

Mid-Mile Holding

Trust, 131

Pro

Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1998); Petty v

70 Idaho 473, 223 P.2d 158 (1950), wherein the

Plaintiff must allege

andprove

the element

0f ownership.
In neither the Gibson appeal, VKSIII appeal, 0r this appeal has Hillen articulated with

statutory clarity

how

“owned” by an Estate.
Hillen

either

If we

Gowen

g0 by the

Field,

Raymond

St.,

or the

Ofﬁce building

UPC and case law, the heirs are the exclusive owners.

was aware “ownership” was an element he had

t0 allege

andprove, 0r he could not

establish standing t0 prevail in an Ej ectment Action. Thus, Hillen claimed ownership

the

IRCP

70(b) Instrument 0f June 2, 2017, purporting to

Having now abandoned
this

appeal

is

his theory

are property

make

by advancing

Hillen the “exclusive titled owner”.

0f ownership, Where in the Record of either Gibson,

there an issue that the Appellant

abandoned one theory, and has not preserved

was

alleged to be “an un—wanted party”.

his evolving theory for review.

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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VKS III,

0r

He has now

Consequently, and relying upon the Record developed in each of these appeals (now
consolidated)

,

the issue hovers over

what

authority, if any, the

IRCP

70(b) Instrument provided

Hillen any reliance, and what Hillen championed his entire proposition to the lower Court(s) to
secure his Judgment for

ej ectment

0f Appellant

entities

from the Ofﬁce building.

This appeal directly challenges Hillen’s use 0f that 70(b) Instrument, and the conﬁrmation

of the invalidity 0f that Instrument for the purpose Hillen has employed

by

established law, cannot be a “titled “owner” 0f

cannot embrace an “ownership” theory,
since ﬁduciaries cannot

own

statutory enactment, hold

The

title

Statute restricts

When

and

application, as Hillen,

Decedent’s property, and the lower Court

PR

Hillen “acts” in the capacity as a

a Decedent’s property

t0 0r

its

0f an Estate,

(Lemp v Lemp supra), nor does an

estate,

by

ownership 0f a Decedent’s property.

UPC,

limits Hillen t0 the provisions enacted within the

his right to take possession of property, restricted to speciﬁc circumstances,

alleged here or have been established t0 exist here.

The

limited in

none 0f which were

PR

limitations require a

demonstrate

“necessity” before a probate Court to take possession of property for the satisfaction of creditors

and other interested persons, and Hillen has not done
theory of ownership t0 pursue

The

UPC

requires a

ej ectment

PR to

in this

that,

and other

but instead went t0 District Court on his

cases,

and

for

What purpose?

resolve valid and approved claims within the administration of

the estate, and in this Estate, there has never been any creditor claims or un—settled interests to

address.

When

there are

liquidation 0f an asset,

no

Where

creditor claims

and n0 interested party in the

estate to require

in the statute has the legislature granted the authority for a

an Ejectment Action When he cannot allege and prove an ownership
the Instrument that violates the statute, the case law, and

interest, other

deemed void

for lack

PR to

than mis—use of

of jurisdictional

authority and due process 0f law under the statute to disrupt the devolution ofproperty interests.
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ﬁle

For Hillen

to

propose there

is

but this “single issue”

—whether Hillen has

an “unwanted party ﬂom estate properly”, notwithstanding Hillen’s

authority to

failure t0 raise

ej ect

and preserve

such a proposition for review, in what manner does that proposition support the fundamental
element 0f an Ejectment Action—ownership 0f property? Hillen
protect

and preserve the

heirs’ assets; the scales are tipped

obligated as a ﬁduciary t0

is

by Hillen

consistently engaging in a

behavior of liquidating Estate assets and destroying a historical legacy preceding the Decedent and
the Estate heirs. This negligent behavior 0f liquidating Estate assets serves

preservation of the Estate. Hillen’s proposition that he

Court t0 be outside the provisions 0f the

“unwanted parlyﬁfom

When
how

estate properly”,

the law says Hillen cannot, and

can that be disregarded by a

is

by

UPC

is

the “titled-owner”

no

interest in the

must be deemed by

this

and case law, and the concept 0f ejecting an

not an issue preserved in this 0r any Record on appeal.
statute, the Estate

PR acting within his

does not,

own

a Decedent’s property,

ﬁduciary duty under the statute?

How

can

Hillen be allowed to engage an Ejectment Action, foregoing the statutory pre-requisite to establish

a necessity in probate Court to take possession of property in the administration of an Estate?

If

and
take

it

be apparent to

now embraces

this

Court that Hillen has abandoned his “exclusive ownership” theory,

the statute that vests

up Hillen’s evolving proposition a

properly”,

title

and possession With the

PR has

When n0 such proposition was

heirs, is this

authority “t0 eject an

raised below,

Court inclined t0

unwanted party from

nowhere identiﬁed

in the

estate

Record 0n any 0f

these consolidated appeals, never addressed in Hillen’s Pleadings ﬁled below, and no statute or

case law has declared a Decedent’s interests to be Estate property—only to be administered for the

beneﬁt of the beneﬁciaries, With the satisfaction of creditors and interested persons.
statutory conﬂict

0f

interest

Where

Title vests in the heirs,

and the Powers delegated

the Administration of the Estate?
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Is there

t0 the

PR

a

in

lower court Actions from that of ejectment, no longer relying 0n

If Hillen is converting his

his alleged “ownership theory”,

estate property”,

for such

What elements

and instead claiming a

will this Court require Hillen to allege

an unwanted party from

below

to attain the standing

an Action, and not demonstrating necessity in the administration 0f the Estate?

If Hillen

n0 longer claims

owner of

the titled

interpretation t0

status as

an “owner”, Where in the

UPC

does

it

say an Estate

is

the property of a Decedent? These consolidated appeals require statutory

even address his proposition

party could be ejected. Arguably,

when

right t0 “eject

it is

if there is “estate

property” from which an un—wanted

the heir that has standing t0 bring an ejectment Action, but

neither a ﬁduciary nor an Estate has the “ownership” interest in the Decedent’s assets,

Hillen has done should not, and cannot as a matter 0f law, be embraced

If the statute is t0

by this

Court.

be enforced, when there are n0 creditor claims, n0 other

question,

and n0 identiﬁed tax

ﬁduciary

is

liability t0 justify

need for a

PR t0

what

interests in

seek possession of property, the

without authority to dispossess those protecting the heirs’ interest in the property.

Neither a Magistrate, nor a lower Court, has authority to abrogate the limitations the Idaho

legislature

adopted through enactment 0f the Uniform Probate Code, and cannot modify the plain

reading and meaning 0f the provisions pertaining to the ownership 0f Decedent’s property interests.

Without the assertion
Action(s), and Hillen

is

t0 ownership, there is

only

left t0

no allegation

to support the

PR’s Ejectment

g0 t0 the Magistrate to demonstrate a necessity

t0 take

possession for a statutorily recognized reason, the only avenue a ﬁduciary was granted under the

UPC,
any

yet Hillen preferred to forum shop, using an Instrument crafted

statutory authority, having abrogated the

statutory devolution

by a Magistrate

that exceeds

due process procedural mandates, contradicting the

0f ownership mandated by the provisions of the

UPC

ownership immediately t0 the heirs or devisees upon death 0f the Decedent.
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that devolve title

and

The

“real concern” presented

by

Hillen’s version 0f the “Nature of the Case”,

is

his

transformation 0r transmutation 0f his Ejectment Action from “exclusive ownership” t0 “a right t0

eject

an unwantedparlyﬁom Estate properly” (Resp.

what

effect that transformation 0r evolution has

Brief, P. 2),

and the question then becomes —

0n his cause of action below?

Hillen has acknowledged he has found himself in the midst 0f a

created, pursuing an Ej ectment Action

June

2017. If that Instrument

2,

is

upon ownership he contends
statutorily

the Magistrate gave

because

ineffective

conundrum he alone has

him on

has been entered in

it

contradiction t0 the statute and case law, lacking any authority to engage such a disposition

Magistrate, where then

If Hillen has

relief

is

the lawful basis for Hillen t0 implore and use

abandoned

he obtained below under

his allegation

0f “ownership”, can there be any right t0 obtain the

reviewing Court upon the Record from which the
granted.

To

address what Hillen

now

essential element required to sustain

wants t0

ej ectment

an Ejectment Action?

this

Instrument

Hillen’s reliance

this appeal,

is

the essence 0f

What brought

that

We

does Hillen

make

his allegation in the

statute,

lower Court,

controversy t0 this Court, stemming from

being the perceived authority for Hillen’s claim

n0

forfeit the

cannot walk away from the cause

upon the IRCP 70(b) Instrument, and has now become an

Court, the sole key t0 his ownership theory,

upon

this

to

this

Judgment and Writ of Assistance were

call his “single issue”,

0f this controversy—the Instrument Hillen relied upon

and

it?

Ejectment Action? This appeal has been presented t0

this

by a

when he ﬁled

n0 case law,

integral

component of

the Action in the lower

just the Instrument

he relied

he claimed the IRCP 70(b) Instrument vested him the “ownership” and authority t0 do

what he wanted with the property—absent any

statutory authority or case

accomplish.
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law for What he sought t0

Hillen’s “single

issue”— a

an un-wanted party ﬂom Estate properly—was

right t0 eject

never raised below, nor ascertainable from Within the allegations of the Ejectment Action ﬁled
below, as the basis he alleged in each appeal below was “ownership”. Hillen used the
Instrument to claim himself the “exclusive

allege

eject

and prove was forthcoming.

If the

element t0 be alleged and proved in an

PR’s transformation, from “ownership”

this t0

ej ectment

70(b)

owner” from Which the element he needed

titled

an un-wanted party from Estate property”,

IRCP

is

now

to

be his

basis,

Where

is

action—it requires ownership t0

t0

to “a right t0

the fundamental

ej

ect—so how

is

be addressed and decided in this appeal?

T0

Hillen’s

new theory—when was

it,

and by

whom was

Appellants in these three appeals became “an unwantedparly”?
did not beneﬁt the property interests 0f the heir(s)?

When

beneﬁt the parcels 0f property they possessed 0r occupied?

How

it

is it

determined any 0f the
that those in possession

did any 0f the three Appellants not

When

did the Appellants not protect

and preserve the property tax exemptions and preserve the property value? When, and by Whom,

were any of the Appellants declared
integrity

for

0f the property, so that a

more expensive

repair?

to

PR

be un-wanted?

Why would any heir want to jeopardize the

could foolishly expose property to rental damage and need

Each Appellant

(referring t0 the consolidated appeals) has served a

very beneﬁcial purpose and service, With the approval, consent, and pursuant to the arrangement

between Victoria and her one son,
Is

it

t0 the

beneﬁt 0f the property

interests.

reasonable to conclude Hillen-Elsaesser has abandoned any theory 0f “exclusive

titled

ownership” of these property parcels, and would consent to the reversal 0f the Judgment that has
granted the ejectment 0f each Appellant upon the abandoned theory of Hillen’s ownership of the
property? Despite What

is

now

Hillen-Elsaesser’s belief this appeal
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is

about a “single issue”, the

fundamental issues that have been raised remain the issues to be decided by

this

coutt—identiﬁed

brieﬂy With respect t0 each of the consolidated appeals, to be the following:

1.

In the absence of any established and demonstrated need for the liquidation of assets

0f an

in the administration

estate,

as determined under I.C.

§15-3-71

1,

does a

Personal Representative have any authority Within the general provisions 0f the
Idaho Uniform Probate Code, LC. §15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), t0 eject these appellants
from their otherwise lawful possession of property that by law (LC. §15-3-101) is
vested in the heirs, and their presence

is

deemed

essential

by the 2/3rds

heir?

a Personal Representative ever "own" estate property, as
opposed to taking and holding "possession" of the property in trust for the beneﬁt of

Under

the

UPC, can

creditors in satisfaction 0f their claims?

Does a Magistrate

in a probate proceeding have any authority t0 transfer
"ownership" of property t0 a Personal Representative by means 0f a IRCP 70(b)
Instrument?

Does

the "conclusive evidence" standard announced in LC. §15-3-709 apply t0 a
Personal Representative's pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" 0f property, as
opposed to a pleading t0 obtain "possession" 0f property, for satisfaction of creditor

claims as an estate administration necessity, t0 which the "conclusive evidence"
standard

was intended

t0 apply

under that section?

deemed

to

be the sole owner 0f Decedent’s property, as a
consequence of the IRCP 70(b) Instrument, then 0n what basis does Hillen-Elsaesser
remain subject to the statutorily-stated trust obligations owed to Decedent’s heir
If Hillen-Elsaesser is

whose

interest has

been allegedly divested as

result

of the entry 0f the

IRCP

70(b)

Order?

deemed

be the sole owner 0f Decedent’s property as a
consequence 0f the IRCP 70(b) Instrument, then on What basis does the “divested”
heir, Vernon, retain standing t0 challenge or seek restraint 0f the un-authorized
actions attempted by Hillen-Elsaesser t0 sell heirs’ property Without any showing of
If Hillen-Elsaesser is

necessity Which

becomes a

Hillen-Elsaesser’s reliance

Hillen advocated these

jurisdictional validity

t0

factual dispute?

upon the IRCP 70(b) Instrument

the sole basis

upon which

Ejectment Actions, and that has raised the question as t0 the

of the IRCP 70(b) Instrument that founded Hillen’s theory t0 create

controversy that has progressed to the Idaho Supreme Court.

B. Reply

is

T0 Respondent’s “Course

0f Proceedings”:
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this

Hillen has incorporated a similar passage he recited in the Gibson appeal and the

appeal, referring t0 a Holographic Will

presents his

commentary

and

transfers.

When

in this appeal within the following

After Victoria’s death, Judge Copsey,

who

is

VKS III

referencing the Estate Case. Hillen

manner:

presiding over Victoria’s estate case

(the “Estate Case”): (1) invalidated Victoria’s will as the product of undue inﬂuence
(2) set aside a series 0f transactions by which Vernon transferred all
0f Victoria’s property t0 himself 0r entities controlled by him. Id. at 465-66, 432
P.3d at 14-15. After issuing these rulings, Judge Copsey appointed Hillen as

by Vernon; and

personal representative 0f the Estate, and entered judgment, pursuant t0 Idaho Rule

0f Civil Procedure 70(b), which, for presentpurposes, vested title t0 the Law Oﬂice
PR. (R. 159-160).3 That Judgment is referred to herein as the “Rule 70
Judgment”. (Highlighted emphasis added, Resp Brief, P. 2-3)
in the

The

transfers

were conducted as Victoria requested and as she directed over months of

discussion. Hillen’s assertion “for present purposes, vested

the PR”,

is

the core

component

in this appeal

initiated the Ej ectment

Hillen has chosen to say

Properties,

transfers,

LLC,

at his

Ofﬁce building Property

in

upon

for his claimed ownership, the basis

upon

Action against each 0f the Appellants.

Vernon

by him” (Respondent’s

controlled

t0 the

and each 0f the other consolidated appeals—the

reference t0 the 70(b) Instrument that Hillen relied

which Hillen

title

“transferred

Brief, p. 2).

all

of Victoria’s property to himself or

Vernon formed the limited

Mother’s request, using her

initials, t0

liability

entities

company,

VHS

speciﬁcally trace the property

with joint interest to reﬂect Vernon’s decades of ﬁnancial/personal contributions, and

effectuating her decision that

Vernon take ownership, contemplated by her long-held

intentions,

expressed by her intentions within her Holographic Will she created over two decades before 0n
Valentine’s day in 1990. There

was nothing

nefarious

by

these transfers, as

it

was what Victoria

requested and had wanted to occur, and consistent With her expressed objectives for decades.
consistent With the

way

she envisioned devolution, and the involvement between Vernon and his

Mother, as described by Victoria’s daughter, “they were a team”, from the passing 0f her husband
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and Vernon’s Father

in 1966, a period over 47-years, they acted together, apparently a healthy

parent—child relationship Hillen cannot, 0r choses not, t0 understand.

This propensity of Hillen to portray events about which he has n0 historical awareness and
speculation,

is

part of

what promotes the controversial environment with the disappointment 0f

Hillen’s conduct While acting as the

conduct and behavior, and

now

PR

in Victoria’s Estate, With Hillen fueling discord with his

inherited

by Ford

Elsaesser, unfortunately

controversial law ﬁrm, Givens-Pursley t0 maintain the

employing the same

same course 0f controversy.

Since Hillen recites speculation, a few facts are in order. Victoria’s Holographic Will was

crafted

by Victoria on Valentine’s

expressions of her intentions, later

day, February 14, 1990, the day she chose t0 hand-write her

conﬁrmed

it

was her symbolic way 0f choosing

express, in writing, her intentions relating t0 her children, reﬂecting

but not

who

all,

for her

own

reasons.

She gave

t0

upon her commitment

day

t0

t0 one,

each previously, but speciﬁcally cherished one son

provided his devotion and commitment to protect her and preserve her interests for those

decades following the death of her husband in the year—1966.
her children, and With her
that Valentine’s day, t0

own

commit

to writing

Oregon,

Who

was her decision t0 make, knowing

fact

What had been her long-held

intentions watching

by

Victoria’s daughter, Victoria Converse, residing

has revealed her awareness 0f the family dynamics, and disclosed her

discussions with Joseph that took place in 1992, discussing their dis—inheritance

their discussions as to

interest to the

son she

What

known to each of her children.

Hillen has received the emails written

in Portland,

It

tenacious and stubborn disposition, elected t0 d0 what she did 0n

had progressed over the decades, a

and

that

why. Hillen knows these

facts

knew their Mother wanted t0 receive
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Who

by

their

Mother,

has assigned her

Joseph,

Who

his

Mother would say had

less

than a casual acquaintance with the truth,

deceived the Court by saying he was u_naware of his exclusion, though discussed in year—1990 on

two occasions and

later

with Victoria Converse again in year-1992, having

known

decades his exclusion, well aware there was n0 inﬂuence, a fact Victoria Converse

Vernon was

Hillen and his attorneys, as
appreciation and devotion

was

Victoria’s

for

salvation,

for over

made

two

clear t0

Which loyalty Victoria’s

unyielding.

was very

detailed in her revelations to Hillen,

conﬁrming Joseph’s

character, also reﬂected in responding letters Victoria wrote t0 Joseph, all

0f which Hillen had

Victoria Converse

access, yet Hillen declines t0 recite

an

What an

heir (Victoria Converse)

knows and

says, expressed in

effort t0 correct this injustice.

Instead, because

0f Vernon’s criticism 0f Hillen’s gross mis-conduct, Hillen would rather

perpetuate and broadcast a false narrative to portray negative perceptions to the Court, petty

because of Vernon’s disappointment with Hillen’s behavior and destruction of the

retaliation

property interests Vernon has spent his entire adult

legacy

left

by Vernon K. Smith,

Sr.,

life

protecting and saving; and the historical

and the Decedent.

Victoria Converse explained to Hillen that

Vernon had n0 reason 0r need

to

inﬂuence his

Mother, instead behaving as an obedient and loyal son, the attributes every Mother would cherish
in a son.

For that loyalty and devotion, Vernon

Mother wanted him

t0

is

criticized for reaping the righteous

reward a

have for his decades of funding, preservation and salvation.

Does not a Mother have a

whom she shall bestow what?

right t0 praise or criticize her

Could

it

read the testimony 0f Carolyn Puckett,

be

that Hillen has not

who

own

children and decide

been a cherished son? Hillen needs

the Magistrate forgot t0 embrace,

long before, during, and long after Victoria had created her
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Who knew

t0

Victoria

Holographic Will, frequently

expressing t0 Ms. Puckett Victoria’s intentions openly to Carolyn for

many

years throughout their

relationship.

Hillen, having received

integrity, driven

righteously

known

by her

and read Victoria Convers’s emails, should take heed of her
and stubbornness

tenacity

came by from her Mother, and

intentions,

Hillen has been

and

made

Intestate interest t0

it

t0 reveal the truth, a character trait she so

was her assumed duty

to restore within her capability

to respect her

What Victoria sought

Mother’s well-

to achieve, a fact that

aware, and t0 demonstrate her true sincerity, Victoria Converse assigned her

Vernon, her contribution t0 restore the destruction taking place by

this injustice

committed upon her Mother’s most personal and heartfelt Holographic Will.

With the destruction of Victoria’s expressed

we now

are t0 endure Hillen’s imprudent

comments

the trans—mutated theory each of the Appellants are

party” and to be ejected each of

intentions maintained for over

that there

now

t0

were nefarious

two decades,

transfers,

but

now

be characterized as “an un—wanted

them from “Estate property”, more of

Hillen’s disappointing

behavior, for which he deserves to be ridiculed. This type of commentary only serves to add to the

disenchantment that demonstrates Hillen was truly not suited to be a
“liquidator”, calling

upon

replaced—which he

has,

his experience as a Chapter 7 Trustee,

and hopefully for the

PR

in

an

and he needed

estate, as

to

he

is

a

be removed or

better.

Neither Joseph nor Hillen were around t0 see, be involved with, ﬁnance, protect, 0r
preserve anything, and Hillen appears inclined to defeat and destroy everything that Vernon and
Victoria stood for, wanting t0 liquidate what they spend nearly a half century protecting and
preserving, with neither a necessity 0r a legitimate purpose t0 continue liquidating, and perceived

t0

be

in total dereliction

0f Hillen’s ﬁduciary responsibilities, his limited authority and the statutory
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restrictions relating to liquidating property interests, deliberately destroying the interests

0f the

2/3rds heir of the Decedent.

Hillen

knows

these property assets were ﬁnanced, funded, protected, and preserved

Vernon, and Without one penny from Joseph, and with no estate creditors to confront 0r
disbursements from this Estate
for needless

taxation for

actually

satisfy, the

approaching $2 million taken by Hillen and his cadre 0f attorneys

is

and wasteful “administrative fees and expenses”, the reason for Which Hillen seeks

liquidate unique property for

n0 beneﬁt

afﬁrmed the

t0

no reason but

an

by

heir, relying

t0

churn

fees,

and

to

in the process creating capital gains

upon another Challenged

belief this

RCP 70(b) Instrument, the basis upon which Hillen

Supreme Court

claims ownership, as he

has stated in the Respondent’s Brief, p.32

Vernon appealed the invalidation 0f the Will, the decision t0 set aside the property
transfers, and the Rule 70 Judgment. Matter ofEstate 0f Smith, supra. As part of
that appeal, this Court considered “any matters occurring up to and including the
post—trial judgment under Rule 70(b).” Id. at 466, 432 P.3d at 15 (2018). After such
consideration, this Court concluded that “the decisions 0f the magistrate court are

afﬁrmed.

Id. at

482, 432 P.3d at 3 1. (Emphasis added)

N0 party made an issue of the IRCP

70(b) Instrument in the appeal, as the

a Party in the appeal, and this Court did not rule upon
enforceability of that Instrument,

which notably was entered

upon

this

IRCP

sole basis for his “ownership”,

and

now

law. Hillen relies entirely

this

Supreme Court, the

IRCP

effect

its

invalidity

in Violation

PR was not even

and void
0f the

status or the

statute

and case

70(b) Instrument, entered 0n June 2, 2017, as being the

arguing that Instrument was addressed

and affirmed by

of which he claims “vested exclusive ownership” in him under the

70(b) Instrument, Which he claims

ownership 0f Decedent’s property

was afﬁrmed

interests

permits, nor the well-established case law

in the

Supreme Court Decision,

establishing

with him, as the PR, something that neither the statute

would support or
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It is

because 0f

this un-substantiated proposition this

Instrument, and embrace the only intended purpose

Violate the statute

and case law? Or was

it

it

Court must address the

was designed

IRCP

t0 accomplish.

Was

70(b)

it

t0

a poorly informed Magistrate’s attempt to restore

Decedent’s ownership t0 property, from Which the statutory scheme 0f devolution would transfer
the statutory ownership from there, in accordance With the

Uniform Probate Code (UPC)?

The only purpose of the IRCP 70(b) Instrument was
interests,

previously transferred to

Victoria H. Smith, who,

interests

the heirs.

would be

by

VHS

Properties,

LLC

then, being deceased, the

statutorily transferred

The poorly conceived

to re-transfer

0n July

4,

Decedent’s property

2012, back to the Grantor,

Uniform Probate Code took

and the

under the enacted statutory scheme of devolution to

crafting 0f the Instrument transferred

title

of property to Hillen,

then the appointed PR, suggesting the magistrate did not have knowledge 0f the

mandates of Decedent’s property

over,

interests, as

such

IRCP

70(b) Instrument

UPC vestiture

is

expressly in

contradiction to the statute and well-established case law.

Hillen has chosen to fashion his authority from this statutorily un-authorized creativity,

and engage

in a statutorily inconsistent assertion

because of the language contained Within the

he IS the

IRCP

“titled

owner” of Decedent’s

assets

70(b) Instrument of June 2, 2017.

Hillen has ﬁled four separate Ejectment Actions in District Court, 0f which this court

has three 0f those decisions currently before

it

on appeal, asserting use of

Instrument, despite being inconsistent With the provisions of the

this

UPC, complicated

IRCP

70(b)

further With

Hillen’s choice t0 engage in ‘forum shopping’ these Ejectment Complaints outside of the

probate Court, with

Whom

it

was thought

the

Supreme Court had placed exclusive

With the Magistrate over the Estate and the heirs’
C. Relief Appellant Requests Regarding

interests.

The IRCP

700)) Instrument
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jurisdiction

It is

proceedings from becoming complicated further, this Supreme

essential, t0 prevent

Court address the erroneous vesture 0f title/ownership 0f Decedent’s assets in the

ﬂawed IRCP

before the adoption 0f the

UPC.

own Decedent’s

Conﬁrmation 0f this

It

title

has always been statutorily required, long

has never been With a PR, Who, according t0 long-established

assets.

Lemp

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

statutory authority

to the statutory requirements

requires a

PR

t0

P. 222,

223 (1919).

and case law does not Violate the PR’s authority

0f administration, but serves to conﬁrm a PR’s administrative authority

It

mandated within the

UPC

is

limited and restricted

and case law.

g0 before the probate Court

t0 consider issues relating to sale

possessory rights over properties, and the preferred in-kind distribution, and not allow a P
initiate carte

and

R to

blanche liquidations by ﬁling Ejectment Actions in District Court where the

commencement of such

actions does not address probate restraints, but only 100k t0 the

elements in an ejectment Action,

—0wnership—the

focus of the District Court, not the issue in

a probate proceeding where necessity involving creditor claims, if exist to be satisﬁed. This
the very reason Hillen

went

to the District

relevant aspects identiﬁed in the

UPC
D.

the

70(b) Instrument. The statute and case law declares a Decedent’s assets are titled

and vested with the heirs of Decedent, Where

law, does not

PR by

is

Court and by-passed the probate Court to avoid

UPC. The PR has

the statutory obligation to

comply with the

and be consistent with the application of due process, statutory mandates, and case law.

What Has Been The Unintended Consequence Of The IRCP
This Instrument entered by the Magistrate 0n June

disposition 0f Decedent’s property if

Instrument deﬁes the objectives 0f the

owned by

UPC,

the

2,

PR

70 (b) Instrument?

2017 has created an un-authorized

of the Estate. Hillen’s use of

this

ignoring necessity t0 take possession 0f property,

a need t0 satisfy creditor claims and un-satisﬁed debt, and ignoring the preferred in-kind
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distribution 0f assets

among

heirs,

Who

alone hold vested ownership of Decedent’s property.

This disregard has enabled Hillen t0 act freely to wrongfully liquidate property
interests,

When

the statute and case

law declare heirs the vested owners, and Hillen’s behavior

has been contrary t0 the obj ectives 0f the

UPC

and

that

0f the 2/3““

heir, as that heir

has always

sought t0 preserve assets, not liquidate them.
Hillen has been a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, the essence of his professional
experience, and in that capacity, pursued liquidation 0f assets, acting on behalf 0f creditors in a

Bankrupt Estate. The obligations 0f Hillen, as a PR, are vastly

were no

creditors,

and the

and the duty must be

interests

different; in this Estate there

0f the rights and desires of the heirs must be considered,

to preserve assets for the heirs.

Hillen, acting

upon

this perception

of his un-fettered ownership, has caused these

needless Actions t0 be ﬁled in the District Court, and these Actions exist only because of the

erroneous placement 0f
invalid and void.

title

With Hillen, and vesture under the Instrument must be declared

Otherwise, vesting

title

in this

manner conﬂicts with

jurisdictional authority to effectuate the provisions of the

UPC, Which

the statute and

statutory authority

must

be held t0 control a Decedent’s property ownership.

The IRCP 70(b) Instrument
ownership 0f Decedent’s property in a

is

in

direct

PR violates

Violation

of existing case law, vesting

the underpinnings of Lemp, supra,

who can

only act as a ﬁduciary, holding no ownership, and must act as a trustee Within the provisions,
restrictions,

The

and limitations of the UPC.
authority, pursuant to the administration

of an estate by a PR,

possession 0f an asset only under certain limited circumstances of necessity to

any existing creditor claims. There were no

creditors’ claims in this Estate, as
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is

limited to

satisfy, in trust,

Vernon resolved

all debts, liabilities,

and potential claims 0f both

death 0f Decedent.

The only obligation came

administrative expenses generated

by Hillen and

his Father

to

and

his

Mother long before the

be the federal taxing authority and the

his cadre 0f attorneys.

The tax

liability

was

resolved previously, prior t0 the present liquidation efforts, as so represented by the PR.

E.

What Was The Intended Consequence Of The IRCP 70(b) Instrument?
This Magistrate declared the transfers t0

VHS

Properties,

was perceived
act to

be

invalid.

t0

gifting,

0n July

4,

LLC

2012, That

POA was

an act 0f “gifting” of

the transfers from Victoria

a re-afﬁrmation 0f the 1999

POA that

be the authority t0 do what was accomplished. The Magistrate declared such

and outside the authority 0f the Power of Attorney; and held

The Magistrate followed up with

Victoria H. Smith

rulings

LLC

Properties,

Power of Attorney, being

Victoria H. Smith’s assets under the 2008

t0

VHS

was

also invalid

upon

that transfer t0

be

the disposition that the 1990 Holographic Will 0f

the controversial claim 0f

undue inﬂuence. Those

were upheld 0n appeal.
After those rulings, the Magistrate sought to reverse certain transfers of July 4, 2012

and restore ownership
to

to Decedent,

which by

statute

would then allow

proceed under the UPC, since Victoria had died on September

the statutory devolution

11, 2013.

The Magistrate,

apparently un—aware of the statutory declarations, entered her Instrument that transferred

property interests t0 Hillen, because of which Hillen claims ownership t0 Decedent’s property,

but,

by law, has

bound by

limited authority in the capacity as a PR, acting in a ﬁduciary capacity, and

the terms of the

UPC.

That ill-worded and poorly crafted Instrument was contrary t0 statute (LC. §15-3-101)

and the well-established case law, Lemp
Fairchild

v.

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147,

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

676 P.2d 722 (1984), and Ellmaker
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P. 222,

v.

223 (1919);

Tabor, 160 Idaho

576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015), ignoring the controlling authority prohibiting a person in a ﬁduciary

capacity to take

title

to

Decedent’s property, limited only t0 possession t0 satisfy approved

claims of a creditor and other interested persons, the authority regarding which
detail in Appellant’s

In

Opening Brief and addressed hereinafter

open Court

in a supplemental

in 2017, during a hearing before the Magistrate

Who

is

identiﬁed in

manner.

crafted that

IRCP

70(b) Instrument, acknowledged being unfamiliar With probate matters, stated two (2) months
after the Instrument

Although

was

entered.

this issue

has been brought t0 the attention 0f the Magistrate, the scope 0f that

Instrument has not been corrected, and a request t0 d0 so has been denied, leaving this
Instrument t0 be addressed by this Supreme Court t0 announce

“ownership” regarding Decedent’s property, as ownership
undermined, degraded, or disregarded, and

abused by Hillen, and

Nowhere

left to

now

is

its

invalidity as t0 the rights of

statutorily determined, not t0

mis—used mis—interpreted, mis—construed and

ﬂounder by the lack of action by the Magistrate
0f Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d

in In re Estate

be

6,

court.

(2018), did the Court

disregard the statute and well-established Idaho law that heirs, not a ﬁduciary,

become

the

vested and titled owners of Decedent’s assets, immediately upon death, and nothing within the

Supreme Court Opinion

either

afﬁrmed any placement of ownership of the property

interests

With either the estate 0r any personal representative, and nothing was argued, 0r decided that

would

alter the statutory provisions that

placed ownership With the heirs, and the statutory

provisions that allowed the Personal Representative possession 0f the heirs interests only,

during the administration,
exercise the statutory

when

power

the Personal Representative has established a necessity t0

t0 obtain possession, for the satisfaction

0f creditors 0r other

interested persons. Otherwise ownership remains with the heirs and distributed to the heirs
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through an in-kind distribution, whenever possible.

Vernon

is

a 2/3rds heir 0f Decadent, retains 2/3rds ownership, as the probate

None of

currently structured. There are n0 creditors.

the heirs are perceived to beneﬁt

is

by

Hillen’s desire to liquidate assets, as doing such only creates capital gains taxation, if sold,

beyond the previously stepped-up
interest. If

an heir wants to

sell

n0

basis, as there are

an in-kind distributed

creditors to address an outstanding

interest, after closure,

then so be

that is a decision for the heir, not Hillen 0r Elsaesser. This irrational conduct, depriving

0f real property that

is

sold,

0r heir.

is,

but

an heir

unique by nature, cannot be replaced, and needlessly exposing heirs t0

capital gains tax they desire not t0 incur,

be

it,

caused from the liquidation 0f assets that should never

arguably, a breach 0f ﬁduciary duty

Vernon has spent

When

his lifetime preserving

creating unnecessary taxation to an Estate

and maintaining these

real property assets,

they are unique, some having historical value, and cannot be replaced, and each Appellant has

been a tremendous assistance with preserving and protecting the properties.
F. Applicable Statutory Authority

And Case Law On Property Ownership

In the absence of any “necessity” arising out 0f the administration of an Estate for the

beneﬁt of creditors/interested persons,

I.C.

§15-3-71

1,

the

UPC

vests ownership of Decedent’s

property with the heirs or devisees, immediately upon death.

statutorily

mandated preference

of estate property

I.C.

for in-kind distribution

among

It

heirs, as

debts and liabilities 0f his Father and Mother

need to

opposed

t0 liquidation

§15-3-906. Hillen was repeatedly reminded his behavior was mis-

guided, as there are n0 creditors, and taxes were satisﬁed. Hillen

tax issue

remains a well-established

was resolved and paid from

liquidate, as substantial cash

many

the proceeds

knows Vernon resolved

all

years ago (decades), and once the federal

from the Hamer property, there remains n0

remained following the sale of the Hamer property,
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now

being churned away with Hillen’s (and possibly

now

Elsaesser’s needless and senseless fees

accruing in these controversial confrontations With his cadre 0f attorneys.
Hillen’s liquidation objectives

were unnecessary

at best,

spiteful

and malicious

at

worst, creating funding for himself and his attorneys, pursuing these matters at the rate that
typically exceeds $30,000.00+

“administrative”

disposition

per month, wasteful expenditures borne 2/3rds by Vernon. This

is

approaching $2 Million, arguably not in any legitimate

preservation 0f the Estate, as statutorily owed,

By

by Hillen and now

Elsaesser.

liquidating, the behavior creates unnecessary capital gains taxes, never the purpose

0f a ﬁduciary, not in the best

interests

of any

These actions remain to be in excess 0f a

heir.

PR’S statutory

authority,

damages,

§15-3-712. Hillen has chosen t0 perpetuate exposure t0 damages because of his

I.C.

and a breach 0f the statutory-ﬁduciary duty

is

remediable by award of

“ownership” claim to Decedent’s property interests—based upon the poorly crafted Instrument.

G. Established Limitations

On Personal Representative Ownership

Idaho law, commencing a century ago, declared a ﬁduciary cannot be an “owner” 0f

IRCP

Decedent’s property, notwithstanding the

ownership 0f decedent’s

assets,

announced

in

70(b) Instrument, as a

Lemp

223 (1919). That case remains consistent With the

v.

UPC

1971, placing title/ownership with devisees or heirs.

executor

is

not the owner 0f any part 0f the

conﬁrmed by provisions 0f
(1984), and Ellmaker

N0

v.

the

UPC

”
estate,

and Fairchild

cannot hold

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184
and LC. §15-3-101, adopted

Lemp

and

v.

PR

in

P. 222,

Idaho in

declared “The administrator or

that principle remains the

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147,

law today,

676 P.2d 722

Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015), cited in the Opening Brief.

Magistrate would deliberately eliminate any heir’s interest created by Statute, as

such intention would be a Violation of LC. §15-3-101 and remain void and un-enforceable, as
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no authority

exists t0 eliminate

an heir’s vested ownership in decedent’s assets under LC. §15-

3-101, yet this wrongful disposition has lingered since June 2, 2017, in Violation of the Statute,
well-established case law, and prohibition that prevents a ﬁduciary from

H.

owning

estate assets.

What Has Transpired By The Unintended Consequences Of Hillen’s Actions?
Because 0f this claim

court, seeking t0 eject

t0 ownership, four (4) cases

have been ﬁled by Hillen

in district

an heir and others, with no necessity, three 0f which cases are currently

on appeal and now consolidated

for appellate review.

With the fourth matter preserving a

issue

regarding the doctrine 0f issue and claim preclusion, employing the doctrine 0f resjudicata the
effect

0f which should control that disposition, being, Hillen v Riverside Farms, Ina,

County Case N0. CV01-20-06707, seeking
t0 preserve the

Farms the Chinden property

farm exemption and maintain the programs that preserve the

irrigation systems

In

t0 eject the entity that

soil conditions

and

under the ownership 0f VHS Properties, LLC.

none 0f these Actions does Hillen’s pleadings

articulate

any necessity

t0 liquidate,

alleging “ownership” but nothing associated with the pre-requisites under the

possession required to address creditor claims, as Hillen
this the

Ada

knows none

exist,

and Hillen

unorthodox and poorly crafted IRCP 70(b) Instrument t0 advance his

unsupported theory of “ownership” of the heirs’ property—to allege the

UPC

criteria]

is

for

using

statutorily

element of

ownership to succeed in an Ej ectment Action.

Can

a district court exercise jurisdiction over a probate controversy Where the

PR

pursues an ejectment claim that impacts the heir’s ownership interest in their inheritance?

Does

when
a

PR

the case law preclude a ﬁduciary

the law has declared

n0 part of the

from claiming ownership of Decedent’s

assets are

avoid the requirement 0f “necessity”

when

owned by

assets,

the ﬁduciary (Lemp, supra)?

Can

seeking t0 obtain possession 0f property from
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an heir? Are requirements

built into the

UPC that preclude such behavior?

Hillen chose the district court forums to avoid the necessity requirement of a probate
Court, and his behavior

would be vehemently challenged, so

t0 avoid the requirement

necessity, he claims ownership to escape that insurmountable burden, so instead

avenue 0f claiming “exclusive

titled

went the

ownership” With the dubious IRCP 70(b) Instrument,

avoiding the required statutory route to seek lawful possession under the

The

of

distinctions that arise out 0f the statutory limitations placed

UPC.
upon

the exercise of a

“power”, as exercised by a ﬁduciary in contrast to Hillen’s claim as “sole owner” of

Decedent’s property, are manifestly signiﬁcant in determining the authority of a PR.
If Hillen

heirs, Hillen

were the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

n0 longer would be subject

t0 the exclusion

0f the statutory

t0 his trust obligation t0 heirs, nor subject t0 heirs’

statutory authority t0 restrain his un-authorized Actions (LC. §15—3-607),

his ﬁduciary breach (LC. §15-3-712). Hillen seeks to act

upon

and seek damages for

that potential

immunity.

This Court must weigh seriously the fact should Hillen be awarded “sole ownership” 0f

Decedent’s property, the heirs’

trust interest is extinguished,

the scope of his statutory authority?

heir’s right

and claims

and then

is

Hillen acting outside

Thus, this Court must correct the error and preserve the

to assert the ﬁduciary breach

from these proceedings.

Hillen must be compelled to embraced the distinction between ownership and the
potential for acquiring possession under the

fate

0f

assets,

and Hillen’s quest has been

his fundamental experience), needlessly

UPC,

a distinction that

t0 liquidate assets, (a

is

highly signiﬁcant to the

Chapter 7 Trustee mentality,

imposing capital gains tax upon the

act that neither the statute nor Idaho case

heirs, a reckless

law support Hillen’s liquidation quest 0r Claim

ownership.
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t0

Signiﬁcant distinctions arise out of statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a

“power” by a ﬁduciary, opposed

t0 a claim

of sole “ownership” 0f Decedent’s property. Hillen

cannot statutorily be deemed “sole owner” t0 the exclusion 0f Decedent’s heirs, and must

remain subject to

heirs’ statutory right t0 restrain un—authorized behavior (LC. §15-3-607),

and

recover damages for any breach of the ﬁduciary duty (I.C. §15-3-712).

This behavior of Hillen, and hopefully not pursued by Elsaesser,
in law, but

crafted

I.

is

not only un—founded

an un-intended consequence by the creation 0f the un—intended error by the poorly

IRCP

70(b) Instrument.

Statutory Limitations

On Hillen’s Probate Authority
PR may

In contrast t0 ownership, a

beneﬁt 0f creditors,
review under

if there

were

UPC provisions

creditors,

VHS

and

in such a situation, his actions

trust, for

the

remain subject

t0

as cited above.2

The only intended function
t0 address transfers to

only seek a grant t0 possession, in

t0

be served by the magistrate’s IRCP 70(b) Instrument was

Properties,

LLC

and return assets

adjudicated previously in prior court proceedings.

When

to Decedent, to the extent not

deceased, titled vesture could only

vest statutorily in the heirs or devisees, never a ﬁduciary of an estate. Notwithstanding the

magistrate’s poorly crafted

IRCP

70(b) Instrument, the legal effect can neither exceed, nor

expand the limited scope 0f the statutory power and authority

that has

been

statutorily granted

(and limited) t0 a ﬁduciary in the administration of an estate, as provided by I.C. § 15-3-701
seq.

and

I.C.

The

2

§15-3-901

et

et seq..

disaster occurring

from Hillen’s expressly-stated objective

Hillen’s claim in these cases has been based

UPC

t0 liquidate assets is the

upon “ownership” 0f Decedent’s property, not mere “possession.” In a

larger

and the remedies and restrictions they provide and address the
concern over the un-authorized actions of a Personal Representative Which is at the center 0f Hillen’s mis—conduct, fueled by the
sense,

it is

the very application of the

Magistrate’s erroneous

IRCP

Statutes, the case law,

70(b) Instrument.
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consequence of defeating an

heirs’ best interests, as

UPC

though his authority under the

is

n0

different than his limited experience as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. Hillen’s actions are

predicated solely

upon “ownership” 0f Decedent’s

property, not

upon any

statutory right to

“possession” for any speciﬁed purpose necessitated in the administration of the Estate for the

beneﬁt of creditors;

it

remains his un-warranted desire to liquidate

assets, regardless

direct contravention to the express standards requiring the preservation

under LC. §15-3-906, and in-kind distribution t0
statutory limitations cannot

The

UPC

heirs,

and

this gross contradiction

is

0f law and

established: “Estates descend at death t0 successors

probated, subject to limitations Which

identiﬁed by any probated Will, or t0 heirs if n0 Will

is

may be implemented through

Comment I.C.

title,

estate property

be permitted under the law and must be corrected.

and case authority

Heirs obtain

0f

0f need, a

administration.” Ofﬁcial

subject to divestment and possession

by

§ 15-3-101,

ﬂ

1).

the ﬁduciary that has a

factual basis of necessity for the exercise 0f the I.C. §15-3-711 power, in the administration 0f

the Estate for the beneﬁt 0f creditors 0r other interested parties.

ﬁling these four (4) district court proceedings

is to

What

Hillen attempts

by

by-pass that statutory mandate, and proceed

as he wants at his sole discretion, believing he can escape liability if acting as an “owner”.

If Hillen is

then

no longer required

t0 act

under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power,

Hillen no longer acting as a ﬁduciary, and does Hillen no longer have any duty to

is

protect assets, and

immune

70(b) Instrument? This

t0 claims

was never

0f

liability

from the mis—use of the poorly crafted IRCP

the intention of the legislature, the courts or the well-

established history of probate law before and after the adoption of the

J.

UPC.

A Probate
An

Court Had N0 Authority, By Use Of An IRCP 70(b) Instrument, T0 Defeat
Heir’s Ownership Interest In Decedent’s Property, Obtained As
Matter Of Law

A

Under I.C. §15—3-101
Though

the Idaho

Supreme Court’s Opinion was not
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question concerning construction and application 0f the

0f that Order — on

its

face

— cannot be construed

IRCP

70(b) Instrument, the language

t0 support Hillen’s contentions that

conferred ownership to Decedent’s property, as the Magistrate was only restoring

Decedent, (though even then arguably was pursued in Violation 0f statutory
process requirements, and lack of in-personum jurisdiction over those from

title

restraints,

Whom

title

it

to

due

was

sought to be actually taken). Prior t0 the death of Victoria H. Smith, her interests were placed

with

VHS

transfer

LLC, never

Properties,

a party to any probate proceeding or any appeal, and that

was speciﬁcally undertaken pursuant

The

“transfer” to Hillen,

to Victoria’s

Wishes and instructions in 2012.

n0 matter how construed, could not exceed

authority as a ﬁduciary, acting in the capacity “as personal representative

conditional authority

is

limited t0 possession 0f property only

UPC

consistent with the provisions 0f the

upon

his limited

0f the Estate.

the exercise 0f a

as necessity requires for the satisfaction

”

This

“power”

0f creditors

0r other interested persons.3

A Personal Representative
by

the

administering an estate

UPC. The Ofﬁcial Comment

to

is

bound by

the limitations

imposed

LC. §15-3-703 notes statutory constraints upon

their

actions, declaring that:

[A] personal representative’s authority is derived from appointment by the public
agency known as the Court. But the Code also makes it clear the personal
representative, in spite 0f the source 0f his authority, is to proceed with the
administration, settlement and distribution of the estate by use of statutory powers
and in accordance With statutory directions. See Sections 3-107 and 3-704.
.

.

Hillen seeks t0 act beyond his statutorily-conferred authority by erroneously claiming

3

Within IRFLP 821

it

corresponds t0 the

IRCP

70.

The

last

sentence of IRCP 821 addresses issuance of an order for transfer of

“title.” (“When any entry is for the delivery of possession, the
0f execution or assistance upon application to the clerk”). Although the
IRFLP is not of issue here it conﬁrms a known legal distinction between “possession” and “title” recognized in the rules. Even
in the absence of corresponding “possession” language in IRCP 70, the entry must be construed as a re—vestment to the heirs —
not t0 Hillen—to exercise only a “power” over the property as statutorily authorized, I.C. §15-3-71 1, When determined to be

“possession,” as opposed to Rule 70’s singular focus transfer 0f

party in

whose favor

it is

entered

is

entitled to a writ

,

necessary.
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he

the “exclusive titled

is

conferred

title

to

Which they have been

Of concern,
(2)

statutorily

IRCP

,9

‘6

personal

as

of

all statutorily-

70(b) Instrument, on Page

references the scope 0f divestment extending to

it

“individually,

heirs

bestowed immediately upon death.

Within the language expressed within the

of the Document,

capacity,

owner” 0f Decedent’s property, divesting

representative,”,

“as

Vernon K. Smith’s

attorney-in-fact

0r

agent

or

ﬁduciary,” and “any other capacity.” Clearly a Violation of that heir’s interest, so upon What
authority does a Magistrate divest an heir of his statutorily decreed ownership in assets?

The

use 0f this irrational “divestment” language raises concern the Magistrate, as subsequently
revealed,

UPC

was unaware 0f the

devolution 0f interests, as the Magistrate had no statutory

basis t0 eliminate an heir’s statutory interest as an “intestate” heir, in contradiction of I.C. §15-

3-101.

N0

magistrate has any statutory authority, power, 0r jurisdictional basis t0 eliminate an

interest statutorily vested

If this Appellate

under

§15-3-101.

I.C.

Court were to continue the perpetuation of this un-lawful “ownership”

vested Within Hillen, maintaining a divestiture of an heir’s statutorily held interests, then each
Intestate heir has

IRCP

been denied

their statutory property rights Without

due process of law, and the

70(b) Instrument must be declared void and unenforceable, as a matter 0f law.

Neither the law, nor any good-faith objective of the

IRCP

70(b) Instrument would

permit this un-intended consequence, and Hillen’s un-authorized premise 0f “sole ownership”
operates to eliminate

all statutorily

owned

interests.4 It is

impossible for any judicial ofﬁcer t0

eliminate an heir’s vested interest in direct contradiction t0 statutory authority.5 Such an

outcome
4

As

that

constitutes an absurd

identiﬁed hereinabove, Vernon’s

and actionable

sister,

Vernon holds 2/3rds ownership of the

to eliminate

Vernon’s

result, as the

Magistrate irrationally creating such

Ann Smith Converse, assigned her 1/3rd intestate interest to Vernon, such
under the current state 0f the proceedings. If the IRCP 70(b) entry is construed
the remaining 1/3 heir the sole heir of the estate, a most absurd result never

Victoria

assets

intestate share, then is

intended by the legislature or the prior decisions of the Supreme Court.
5
The “Slayer’s Act,” as codiﬁed at I.C. §15-2—803, is the only statutory authority that by-passes an intestate heir’s interest in an
estate,

deemed

t0

have pre—deceased the Decedent.
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an absurdity,

deemed

if

t0

be acting in a judicial capacity,

may

still

claim judicial immunity,

but by analogy to the rules 0f contract construction, used in the interpretation of Court Orders,

n0

effect

would be given

to a

Court Order that creates an absurd

Schieche

v.

Pasco, 88

acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority

is

addressed

result.

Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964).

The conduct of a Court
in Appellant’s

Opening

App. 2008), was

cited,

Brief,

wherein State

v.

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731

and the Armstrong Court addressed the issue succinctly, by

[C]0urts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction

mean simply

(Ct.

stating:

when

they

committed error because the action that was
taken did not comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts
have referred t0 a lack 0f “jurisdiction” when perhaps more precisely meaning
that a motion 0r complaint was not timely ﬁled, that a condition precedent t0 the
right t0 ﬁle the action was not satisﬁed, or that governing statutes 0r court
rules did not authorize the particular decision made bV the court. (citations
omitted) 146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734 (bold/underlined emphasis, and
really

that the court

parenthetical reference t0 “citations omitted,” added).

Armstrong

cited t0

California’s

Supreme Court decision

in

People

v.

American

Contractors Indemnity C0., 33 Ca1.4th 653, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004), wherein
the proposition

was adopted

that a court, acting contrary t0 authority conferred

acted in excess ofits iurisdiction. 146 Idaho

at

376, 195 P.3d at 735.

As

by

such, this

statute,

IRCP

M

70(b)

Instrument must be held to be void and of no force or effect.

Our Supreme Court,
(201 1)

expressly

jurisdiction

in State

v.

Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3

acknowledged the rationale

and authority in Armstrong.6

in

Armstrong —

differentiating

Courts have authoritatively cited Armstrong,

subsequent t0 the Supreme Court’s decision in Hartwig, demonstrated in State

Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct. App. 2014), and State

6

Until superseded

by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court,

Appeals are binding precedent upon lower Idaho

courts. State

between

v.

Vaughn, 156

Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

580

upon the same question, opinions of the Idaho Court of
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87, 842 P.2d 660, 665—66 (1992).

as issued
v.

v.
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n.2,

288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2
It

(Ct.

App. 2012).

remains neither rational nor judicially prudent for a Magistrate t0 allow Hillen to

carry into effect his advocation of “sole ownership” of property interest that well-established

law prohibits him from owning, given the prohibition announced

in

Lemp

397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919), declaring “The administrator 0r executor

any part of the

estate,

v.

is

Lemp, 32 Idaho
not the owner 0f

and the pre-emptive statutory vesture of exclusive ownership with the

Decedent’s heir(s) immediately upon death 0f the Decedent. Casemaker® conﬁrms there has
never been any negative treatment of

this

authority in any

subsequent cases over the

succeeding 101 years.

N0

magistrate, acting with a judicious objective, in the capacity as a judge, exercising

thoughtful jurisprudence,

ownership

interests

would

intentionally Violate a statutorily

mandated devolution 0f

of Decedent’s property mandated by the UPC, vesting interests to someone

other than the legislature mandated Within the Statute.

No

Magistrate

is

allowed to deliberately

defy the statutory mandates of property ownership, as to do so exceeds a magistrate’s
jurisdictional authority.

Hillen’s claim he has

become

the sole

owner of Decedent’s property, defying

the

statutory delegation of an heirs’ interests, coupled With a magistrate’s failure to preserve the

statutory integrity

mandated by the UPC,

is

both disturbing and disappointing, serving only to

perpetuate an illogical use and an aberration of the legislature’s intended objective and
construction of property rights and the use

IRCP

70(b), absurdly fostering a mis—placed use of

an Instrument to unlawfully exceed the authority of a ﬁduciary, and mis-use of the jurisdiction

and authority 0f a magistrate, requiring
and a jurisdictional basis for

this

Court t0 void the Instrument for lack 0f statutory

entry, perpetuating

such mis-use by Hillen to needlessly and
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senselessly engage the liquidation 0f heirs’ property, churning

more

irrational

and unnecessary

attorney fees, pursuing actions inconsistent With the mandated in-kind distribution the Idaho

Legislature contemplated

when adopting 0f the Uniform Probate Code

witnessing an Estate that has n0 creditors, exposed t0 paying what
million in attorney fees and expenses to a

PR

and

experience t0 these heirs; and a primary example

his cadre

Why

in 1971, yet this court is

is fast

approaching $2

0f attorneys, a very frustrating

Victoria H. Smith engaged in the

behaviors she did t0 bequeath her worldly possessions to Vernon, ﬁrst by her Holographic Will

and then distribution through the transfer

t0

VHS Properties, LLC, t0 eliminate probate.

Hillen’s mis—guided behavior, and a magistrate’s failure t0 correct this irrational entry,

has perpetuated a destructive course 0f action, and this Appellate Court must protect and
enforce the purpose and integrity 0f the statutory authority and devolution 0f property

ownership, and prevent such behavior that damages heirs, and creates claims for breach 0f
Hillen’s ﬁduciary responsibilities to protect and preserve the successors’ interests, about

Which

he has taken an oath to uphold and enforce the limitations of his authority and posted bond.

K.

The IRCP 70(b) Instrument, Construed By Hillen T0 Transfer “OWNERSHIP” Of
Decedent’s Property T0 Him, Was Never Placed At Issue Or Decided Upon The Appeal
Of The Holographic Will And Power Of Attorney
Appellant has addressed this aspect in the Opening Brief, but considering the persistent

construction Hillen continues t0 place

upon

this

IRCP

to reign Hillen in, this proposition Hillen pursues has

by

this Court’s

never been an ownership right conﬁrmed

Decision in the Matter ofEstate omez'th, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d

(2018). His perception that

disposition to

70(b) entry, and the magistrate’s failure

conﬁrm

it

6,

15

does invites this response, as this Court did not engage in any

Hillen’s ownership of Decedent’s property interests, as this Court never

embraced Hillen’s claimed ownership, and there

is

no support within any Appellate Court
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precedent, as his position violates well-established case law, and contradicts the statutory

ownership formulated Within the Uniform Probate Code by the Idaho Legislature.

The bifurcated appeal

to the

Supreme Court addressed two

issues, presented to,

and

decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in the Matter ofEsz‘ate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432

P.3d
14,

15 (2018). Those

6,

two

issues were: (1)

Did

the probate court err in

1990 Holographic Will of Victoria H. Smith invalid due

the probate Court err in setting aside the July 4,

interests t0 the

gifting?

n0 issue

LLC, upon

On both

now been
IRCP

property under an

Supreme Court afﬁrmed

was made

0f Victoria H. Smith’s property

title

vested in the heirs.

t0 set aside the transfers, the property, not otherwise

act,

would be returned

N0

as there

0n

by

and

t0

the legislative

one thought the statutory scheme mandated by the Statute

that

would cause a head-on

collision

between provisions of the

and an ill-conceived procedural transfer within a void transaction.

raised or decided

t0 Decedent,

transferred pursuant to the statutory devolution established

would encounter an Instrument

UPC

Did

asserted with Hillen’s claim to hold ownership of Decedent’s

adjudicated by the district court in a prior judicial

enactment Within the UPC.

(2)

the decision 0f the magistrate, ﬁnding

70(b) Instrument that contradicts the

the disposition

become properly

transfers

undue inﬂuence? and

ﬁnding the power 0f attorney used did not speciﬁcally authorize

questions the

that has

Once

the

2012

to

ﬁnding the February

that appeal construing the

was no controversy then

ripe issue for appeal, as Hillen

N0

issue

was being

purpose or intent 0f the IRCP 70(b) Instrument,

meaning or use by Hillen

in existence as to

its

was not a party

in the appeal,

appointment 0r his behavior. There was n0 envisioned controversy

t0 establish a

and no issue affecting
at the time, as there

his

was n0

erroneous application as t0 the consequential effect 0f the Instrument that restored ownership
t0 Decedent, as

it

should be statutorily clear the ownership, as a matter 0f law, vested in the
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heirs, not

any ﬁduciary, and Hillen had taken no action

t0 suggest

he was planning any

nefarious conduct.

No

one envisioned such a mis-application would be pursued in Violation of the UPC,

and the return was

t0

be t0 the entitlement 0f Decedent’s

0f the UPC, despite What

is

heirs, as

governed by the provisions

being maliciously contended by Hillen currently, and unfortunately

not reined in by the magistrate.

On the Supreme
was declared

t0

Court appeal, n0 issues were raised 0r decided t0 the effect that Hillen

be the sole “owner” 0f Decedent’s property, as opposed

a statutory power to acquire possession, in
persons, as provided

Hillen

made

by

the

a party t0 the appeal, so that issue

IRCP

was never

70(b) Instrument

was then deceased (September

Instrument was entered June 2, 2017, almost four years
the

Supreme Court

heirs

were divested of their statutory

and there was no disposition
subject t0 the

UPC

that as a result

or other interested

asserted t0 the district court.

ripe for

11,

later.

UPC

Nor was

any decision. The

was “understood”

re-instatement t0 the beneﬁt 0f the heirs, from Which the

devolution, as Victoria

What could only be

trust, solely for satisfy creditors

UPC, none of Which was

“divestment” language reﬂected in the

t0

to

accomplish

would proceed With

the

2013) when the IRCP 70(b)

There was no determination by

interest vesting

under LC.

§

15-3-101,

of any such Instrument, Hillen was no longer

constraints, acting as a ﬁduciary, or that Hillen

was

free t0

proceed with

unfettered liquidation of the heir’s vested property interests, Without reference t0 any necessity
for liquidation

of that property to address a creditors’ interest t0 be addressed in the

administration of an Estate, of Which none existed.

This court expressed one statement Within the Idaho Supreme Court’s recitation 0f the
factual and procedural background 0f that appeal wherein the Court’s single reference to the
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Rule 70(b) Instrument

is

the following:

In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule 0f Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title t0 all 0f Victoria’s real and personal property
in the personal representative

Who had been

Vernon appealed these

appointed.

decisions, and this Court granted Joseph’s

from the magistrate court pursuant

for acceptance 0f appeal directly

motion

t0 Idaho

Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation t0 bifurcate the
appeal t0 ﬁrst address anv matters occurring up t0 and including the posttrial iudgment under Rule 70(b) before considering anv matters occurring
thereafter. The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent
Noah Hillen, is not participating in this portion 0f the appeal. 164 Idaho at
466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).
Hillen construes this single statement t0

assets,

ownership of Decedent’s

his sole

not the heirs as statutorily delegated and mandated by case law, construing the

commentary
Decedent’ s

N0
what

conﬁrm

t0 default into “divestment”

interests.

such issue 0f Hillen’s claimed ownership was raised by either party in the appeal, 0r

effect to

becoming

0f the heir’s statutory devolution 0f ownership of

be given the magistrate’s

efforts at

ripe With the mis—application

ownership restoration, and

from the intended

act 0f that restoration,

addressed here, challenging Hillen’s un-founded reliance upon the

when no such

issue

was decided by

the

Supreme Court

now with the

t0

any

IRCP

effect

it

issue

can be

70(b) Instrument,

of the IRCP 70(b)

Instrument transferring ownership in any manner contrary t0 the mandates of the

UPC.

There was no issue developed or ripe for any adjudication on that appeal concerning the
interpretation, effect, or

enforcement 0f the

title to

controlled

UPC. The only

the

issues

were the Will and

appeal determined the validity of the Will,
Testate probate, in

70(b) Instrument on the question 0f any

0r ownership 0f Decedent’s property, as ownership

determination of

by

IRCP

it

Which case Vernon was the

transfers t0 the

is

exclusively

LLC, and

remained un-certain Whether

this

was

until the

t0

be a

sole devisee under Victoria’s Holographic Will,
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or if an Intestate probate, an heir as a matter 0f law and vested with ownership as an heir.

7

Hillen cannot construe the Court’s statement as being anything other than obiter

dictum, as addressed in Smith

(Bistline,

(“‘[A]

J,

v.

Angeli, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992)

concurring in the reversal 0f a judgment and remand for further proceedings)

remark by the way;’

that

is,

an observation 0r remark made by a judge in pronouncing

an opinion upon a cause, concerning some

rule, principle, or application

of a question suggested by the case

but not necessarily involved in the case or essential

t0 its determination;

.

.

.”).

Long—standing Idaho
differentiating

at bar,

of law, or the solution

authority

supports

the

interpretation

of appellate decisions

between issues actually raised and issues actually decided by the Court, and

matters simply referred t0 Within the recitation 0f the case Within the decision. Bashore
Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925), (“There

between What

is

said in an opinion and what

is

is

v.

a pronounced line 0f demarcation

decided by

it.”

(citation omitted; italicized

emphasis added». See Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity

v.

Evans, 123 Idaho

573, 586, 850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993), (McDeVitt, C.J., concurring and dissenting); North Side

Canal C0.

v.

Idaho Farms C0., 60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark

McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123, 261
established history and

would mandate

P. 244,

245 (1927). This

line

v.

of authority has a long-

application of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis.

This principle of interpretation, as applied to Appellate Opinions, and as based upon the

Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Bashore

v.

Adolf, supra, has recently been applied

7

by

The IRCP 70(b) Instrument was entered for the purpose 0f restoring Decedent’s prior ownership, not alter the
scheme 0f ownership by unlawfully conveying ownership t0 a Personal Representative. The Idaho
Supreme Court neither addressed, nor decided, any issue other than the 2012 transfers 0f Decedent’s property t0 a
limited liability company, and the validity of the Decedent’s Holographic Will. The Supreme Court’s reference t0
the IRCP 70(b) entry provided a demarcation in the estate process of the bifurcation 0f What was an issue 0n
appeal, deﬁning those two issues on appeal, Which encompassed the time period in the scope of the bifurcated
appeal. The appeal followed the parties’ stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to address only the will and validity of
the transfers to the LLC, before considering matters thereafter, as identiﬁed in 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
statutory
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Idaho’s U.S. District Court

in,

AMX Intern,

1087, 1091-92 (D. Idaho 2010);

(“The Idaho Supreme Court

Hash

itself

Inc.

U.S.,

v.

v.

Battelle

Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d

454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D. Idaho 2006)

has stated that

its

opinions “must be considered and

construed in the light 0f the rule that they are authoritative only 0n thefacts 0n which they are

founded. General expressions must be taken in connection With the case in Which those
expressions are used. Bashore

v.

Adolf, supra, has been cited in Idaho 21 times, according to

Casemaker 4®, without any negative treatment

in

any of its holdings.

Hillen’s perceived construction 0f the Idaho

conﬁrmed ownership

t0

him

exclusively,

is

Supreme Court’s

decision, claiming

inconsistent with the provisions 0f the

UPC

it

(a right

of possession and “power” for the satisfaction of creditor claims and other interested persons),

and remains expressly prohibited by the holding
the prohibition in

Lemp

administrator or executor

v.

is

as t0

ownership mandated by the

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

P.

222, 223

Statute,

(1919),

and

(“The

not the owner 0f any part 0f the estate.8 The principle expressed

Within that case remains undisturbed authority in Idaho, With n0 negative treatment of that

authority,

conﬁrmed by Casemaker4® Lemp has been subsequently

decisions, In

Re MacDonnell ’s

Estate, 56

Nev

67 Idaho 294, 178 P.2d 382 (1947), Vaught
Caldwell

v.

v.

cited Within four appellate

346, 53 P.2d 625, (1936);

Malone

Struble, 62 Idaho 352, 120 P.2d

v.

Van Etten,

259 (1941); and

Thiessen, 50 Idaho 515, 92 P.2d 1047 (1939), and soon cited in this disposition.

Court judgments, judicial and administrative decrees, are subject to the same rules 0f
interpretation as the construction 0f contracts.

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190

P.3d 925, 928 (2008); City ofPocatello v Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 306, 396 P.3d 1184, 1188

8

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code,

this principle

0f law has not been altered by Idaho’s 1971

adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, and in fact has been embraced by and effectuated by the mandated transference of
Decedent’s interests immediately to the heirs or devisees upon death, and not to any appointed ﬁduciary by the effects of
I.C.§15-3-101.
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(2017).

A prominent rule 0f contract interpretation is they are interpreted in regard t0 the then-

existing law.

Path

LLP

t0 Health,

(“‘This Court has held that “it

every written contract.

,9”,

interpretation in Application

(“What the court

is

213 (1946) (noting

.

.

that

.

.”);

axiomatic that extant law

(citations

and

must be taken
in,

and

the provisions 0f the

applies t0 any interpretation t0 be

any interpretation 0f What was decided

’s

t0

the

Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d 212,

compliance with the law

strict

UPC

in

.

.

.”).

.

in 1971, in effect at the time

is,

0f the

as a matter 0f law, incorporated

made regarding

the Rule 70(b) Entry as well as

Supreme Court’s opinion then on

The IRCP 70(b) Instrument can only be

UPC provisions,

a part of

was expressly applied

rule

referenced appeal in Matter 0f Estate 0f Smith, supra,
within

made

in connection With the statutes as they then

In re Anderton

an executor must act “in

The adoption 0f

This

omitted).

written into and

is

ofKaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206 P.2d 528, 533 (1949),

said, therefore,

existed and applied,

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016)

v.

interpreted

appeal.

and applied consistent With the

not in contradiction of it, which confer upon a ﬁduciary (PR) only a “power”,

not ownership, allowing a right t0 “possession” only
the estate for the beneﬁt ofcreditors

When necessaryfor

and other interestedpersons.

I.C.

the administration 0f

§15-3-71

1.

Hillen never

alleged a need under LC. §15-3-711 Within his pleadings for ejectment in any of the district
court Actions, relying

upon alleged ownership, going outside

avoid the application of the provisions of the
interests

of the heirs in property Hillen seeks to

Hillen’s argument the Idaho

UPC

the probate Court’s jurisdiction to

and the exclusive property ownership

sell.

Supreme Court should conﬁrm

his

ownership claim

is

specious, and Hillen cannot be allowed t0 liquidate unique property holdings in contradiction

of the restrictions placed upon his ﬁduciary responsibilities, and his disregard for
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this limited

authority he has within

is

deemed t0 be

Which he

t0 exercise his responsibilities,

is

t0

exceed that authority

actionable.

Can Be N0 Enforcement Of A Void Instrument

L. There

Signiﬁcant constitutional issues arise
party are

and

impugned and

assailed

power

jurisdiction, or the

substantive due process rights 0f a third-

by a Magistrate Without

as an inferior Court t0

un—authorized language used in the

IRCP

0f the statutory provisions within the
the Magistrate

when

knowingly engaged

statutory authority

do What has been done by the expressed, yet

70(b) Instrument. The Magistrate

UPC

and inpersonum

is

either

on ownership of Decedent’s property

in a statutory Violation

ﬂ-aware

interests, 0r

and a wrongful taking 0f property,

in

Violation of the due process requirements under the United States and Idaho Constitutions,

rendering the Instrument void as a matter 0f law.

Property interests cannot simply be taken by a Court in Violation of due process.
Investments, Inc.

v.

City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004).

a void Order or Judgment

is

characterized as a taking in Violation of the 14th

the United States Constitution.

Any

(W.D.N.C., 1921).

Seaboard Air Line Ry. C0.

v.

Any

act

BHA
upon

Amendment

Fowler, 275

F.

to

239, 240

continued enforcement of a “void” Instrument constitutes a “taking” of

property interests, speciﬁcally offending the statutorily vested interests of an heir of a

Decedent. There
Instrument, as
the 5th and 14th

is

now

no

jurisdictional basis behind the irrational usage

attempted by Hillen to be applied. The lack 0f due process, combined With

Amendment Violations,

Hillen seeks t0 act
jurisdictionally void

serve as a

PR

0f the Rule 70(b)

IRCP

under the

upon

is

not the background of an enforceable Judicial decree.

this statutorily un-authorized, constitutionally defective,

70(b) Instrument. Hillen

restrictions

is

and

an attorney, accepted the appointment t0

and limitations formulated within the UPC, and took an
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oath t0 perform his statutory responsibility within the conﬁnes of the

UPC, and not

act as a

Chapter 7 Trustee.

While the defects remain of concern,
98

as declared in

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley

S. Ct.

(1871), and Sierra Life Ins. C0.

v.

v.

Stump

v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,

Fisher 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646

Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 627, 586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978),

Appellants and counsel focus preference to correct this un-intended consequence of the
erroneous mechanism used by the magistrate, and operate Within the requirements 0f the

The continuing disregard
to perpetuate needless

by

for the statutory limitations affecting vested interests

damages

t0 heirs

and the disrupted

interests

0f heirs serves

of the third—parties damaged

Hillen’s un-authorized activity, and this Court has the inherent authority t0 identify

was

the limited purpose 0f the

cannot

alter the statutory vestiture

Decedent
declare

IRCP

to

What

70(b) Instrument in this probate proceeding. The entry

of property ownership emanating from the demise 0f the

someone Who cannot own any

Hillen’s

UPC.

ﬂawed and mis—placed

part of a Decedent’s property. This Court

void

interpretation

and

an

must

un-constitutional

interpretation of an ownership restoration.

In Sierra Life Ins. C0.

court declared the effects

v.

Granaz‘a, 99 Idaho 624, 627,

586 P.2d 1068, 1071 (1978), the

upon lack of personal jurisdiction and due process,

(lack of statutory

authority), stating:

Furthermore, because 0f the serious ramiﬁcations and consequences Which
could follow from a court acting without jurisdiction over the subject matter, we
recognize that it is important t0 keep that concept clearly deﬁned. For example,
the defense 0f lack 0f iurisdiction over the subiect matter is never waived
(LR.C.P. 12(h)); purported iudgments entered bv a court without iurisdiction
over the subiect matter are void and as such are subiect t0 collateral attack,
and are not entitled t0 recognition in other states under the full faith and
credit clause 0fthe United States Constitution (Restatement 0fJudgments, § 7
(1942!. In addition, judges who act without jurisdiction over the subject

matter

may be

liable for

damages

in civil actions.
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v.

Sparkman, 435

U.s. 349, 98 s. Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley
335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871).

The

authority that requires relief from void Instruments

under the law. See McClure Engineering, Ina,
P.3d 1189, 1192

App. 2006).

(Ct.

adversely affected by

A

Docket No. 38493.
affected

by

it.

it.

Burns

v.

Cuevas

v.

Fisher, 13 Wall.

not a discretionary principle

Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953, 155

A void judgment can be

v.

is

v.

attacked at any time

by any person

Barraza, 277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012), Idaho Supreme Court

void judgment can be attacked

at

any time by any person adversely

Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). This Court

narrowly construe[s] what constitutes a void judgment." Hartman

v.

United Heritage Prop.

"

&

Cas. C0., 141 Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340, 344 (2005).

The concept 0f a void Instrument was addressed
v.

in

Jim

& Maryann Plane Family

Trust

Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 933, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015), referring t0 lack of personal

jurisdiction, subj ect matter jurisdiction,

the statutorily

and a Violation 0f due process. This Instrument violates

mandated devolution of a Decedent’s property, and the magistrate has n0

jurisdictional authority to divest an heir,

constitutional

Which ownership cannot be defeated by an un-

and jurisdictionally defective IRCP 70(b) Instrument by a magistrate

that

exceeds both a jurisdictional power and statutory authority.
Hillen cannot be allowed to deprive heirs of their statutory property rights, and the law

does not support the use being

made of

the

IRCP

shortcoming, as ownership in an Ej ectment Action

is

70(b) Instrument. Hillen must sense this

fundamental t0 such an Action, yet Hillen

has sought to “evolve” his actions t0 the ejectment of an unwanted party. If Hillen cannot be

made

the “exclusive

meet the

criteria t0

owner” of Decedent’s property by the IRCP 70(b) Instrument, he cannot

support an Ejectment Action, forcing Hillen t0 proceed Within the probate

Court t0 establish “necessity” to take possession, which he will not seek t0 undertake, as there
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were no creditor claims

to require his quest to liquidate.

Appellants seeks t0 mitigate damages and function Within Vernon’s 2/3““ ownership
interest as

an heir of Victoria’s

assets, as

Vernon’s possession of the Ofﬁce building remains a

preservation beneﬁt t0 the property.

There
there

is

is

no

legal basis for the ejectment

no consent from the

exclusive titled ownership

heirs,

and

that concept

was never

asserted in Hillen’s Complaint,

alleged 0r argued;

knowing

Ada County Highway

ejectment Action, as conﬁrmed by

LLC, 145 Idaho

of “an un—wanted party from Estate property”,

Dist.

v.

that

it

element

if

has only been

is critical

to

any

Total Success Investments,

360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), Where proof of ownershig,

is

foundational t0 achieve

standing. Hillen structured his foundational requirement through this ill-conceived Rule 70(b)

Instrument t0 achieve his “self—interest”

limits

ej ectment efforts,

but Hillen must be held t0 act within the

0f his ﬁduciary capacity, and he knows he can never be a

property, an aspect of law he

must be bound

the mandates articulated Within the

t0 respect,

conﬁned

titled

owner 0f a Decedent’s

t0 his limitations

and

Uniform Probate Code knowing ownership

vested with the heirs upon death, subiect only t0 administration by the ﬁduciary,
take possession

upon showing of

is

by

restricted

immediately

empowered

t0

necessity for the satisfaction of creditors’ claims and other

interested persons, but absent such claims or interests,

no basis

to

employ the

un—constitutional

entry 0f the I.R.C.P. 70(b) Instrument, t0 wrongfully enable a ﬁduciary t0 eject an occupant and

terminate a valuable service that beneﬁts the heirs.

CONCLUSION
This appeal seeks reversal of the Judgment entered by the lower Court upon the
Pleadings, claiming “ownership”, the ﬁlndamental element t0 prevail in an Ejectment Action,

which element Hillen does not possess,

as Hillen’s basis for ejectment has relied
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upon

the

I.R.C.P. 70(b) Instrument that

only heirs are the vested and

void of any statutory authority for

is

titled

its

entry.

As

a matter of law,

owners of a Decedent’s property, and the right of possession

has not been taken from the heirs. Consequently, Hillen had no standing to allege or prevail

upon an ejectment Action,

he does not, and cannot, hold the exclusive ownership of

as

Decedent’s property, and the I.R.C.P. 70(b) Instrument, upon Which he has

relied, is

void

if

used t0 claim Hillen’s ownership to support an Ej ectment Action.
This Court must compel the mandatory application of the Statute, as mandated by Hoffer
v.

Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), as the statutory scheme (UPC)

ambiguious and remains the controlling law, in the absence of a necessity to

is

un-

satisfy creditor

claims and interest deﬁned by Statute. There shall be no severance of the heir’s titled ownership

and possessory

interests,

and the Personal Representative holds no ownership

interest to

advance an Ej ectment Action.
Respectfully submitted this

8th

day 0f December, 2020.

Vernon K. Smith
Vernon K. Smith
/s/

Attorney for Appellants.
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